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Abstract
Are price-matching guarantees anticompetitive? This paper examines the incentives for price-
matching guarantees in markets where information about prices is costly. Under some conditions
the conventional explanation of price-matching announcements as facilitating collusion ﬁnds sup-
port, and is even strengthened. But our model provides an additional explanation for the practice.
A price-matching guarantee may be a credible and easily understood means of communicating to
uninformed consumers that a ﬁrm is low-priced. The credibility of the signal to uninformed con-
sumers is assured by the behaviour of informed consumers. We contrast the testable implications
of our model with those of the anticompetitive theories and discuss supportive evidence from an
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Are price-matching guarantees anticompetitive? This paper examines the incen-
tives for price-matching guarantees in markets where information about prices is
costly. Under some conditions the conventional explanation of price-matching an-
nouncements as facilitating collusion ￿nds support, and is even strengthened. But our
model provides an additional explanation for the practice. A price-matching guaran-
tee may be a credible and easily understood means of communicating to uninformed
consumers that a ￿rm is low-priced. The credibility of the signal to uninformed
consumers is assured by the behaviour of informed consumers. We contrast the
testable implications of our model with those of the anticompetitive theories and
discuss supportive evidence from an illustrative sample of retailers.
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In many retail markets, sellers not only set prices but announce a guarantee that
they will match the lowest advertised price that a customer can ￿nd in the market.
Price matching is observed in markets for sporting goods, personal computers, books,
consumer electronics, luggage, tires, and many others.1 Price-matching guarantees,
or meeting-competition clauses as they are sometimes called, would appear to be
pro-competitive. Customers do not complain about getting guaranteed low prices.2
Investment analysts have viewed announcements of such guarantees as an increase in
the intensity of competition.3
In the economics and antitrust literatures, however, price-matching guarantees
have a bad name. These guarantees are seen as a way to collude. The argument is
that the guarantees facilitate cartel pricing by removing the incentive to undercut
(Hay 1982, Salop 1982). The ￿rm oﬀering a price-matching commitment to buyers
is in fact guaranteeing to its competitors that any lower price by them would be
matched immediately￿eliminating the gains from the price cut. A second theory
explains price matching as a means of price discriminating among consumers (Png
and Hirshleiﬀer 1988). Firms oﬀering price-matching guarantees provide discounts
selectively to customers who shop for and are aware of lower prices in the market
while charging a high list price for non-searchers. Edlin (1997) uses this argument to
suggest that the market-wide impact of the practice is to limit the disciplining power
of active shoppers on market prices: whereas price searchers usually provide a positive
externality to non-searching customers by driving the price down for everyone, in a
1 Edlin (1997) and Arbatskaya, Hviid and Shaﬀer (1999). A well-publicized example of a price
matching guarantee is Gateway￿s announcement on May 30, 2001 that it would match key competi-
tors￿ prices on comparable PC￿s. The Gateway Guarantee promises customers that if they ￿present a
current ad from Compaq, Hewlett-Packard, Dell, IBM, Sony or Toshiba for a new PC or server with
speci￿cations at least equal to Gateway￿s speci￿cations,￿ then Gateway will sell them a comparable
PC ￿for as much as $1 less than the advertised price of its rivals￿ (The Wall Street Journal,M a y3 1 ,
2001). The press release accompanying the announcement notes that the guarantee will be launched
￿with broadcast and cable TV advertising, as well as a full-page ad in USA Today and dozens of
local daily newspapers across the country.￿
2 For example, see the consumer reactions to the Gateway Guarantee in Geek.com (May 30,
2001).
3Investment analysts viewed Gateway￿s announcement of price matching as a step up in the P.C.
price war (The Wall Street Journal, Ibid; TheStreet.com, July 11, 2001 ).
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shopping are limited to the active shoppers themselves. A ￿rm need not lower price
to all consumers just to capture the searchers. The theory of price matching as
anti-competitive is thus extended to markets with large numbers of sellers.
Neither of the theories of anticompetitive price matching is compelling as an expla-
nation of the wide range of markets in which the guarantees are observed. Prices do
not appear to jump to monopoly levels when price-matching guarantees are oﬀered,4
and the large number of ￿rms in the markets where the practice is observed is also
inconsistent with the basic cartel theory. The price discrimination theory accounts
for the observation of price matching in markets with large numbers of ￿rms. It also
accounts for the fact that in most cases only some ￿rms in a market oﬀer the guar-
antees. But this theory requires that the price-matching ￿rms set higher list prices
than at least some non-price matching ￿rms. This prediction is inconsistent with the
limited evidence available.5 Moreover, the price discrimination theory requires that
a substantial number of consumers actually invoke their rights under the guarantee.
No evidence of a signi￿cant rate of cashing-in of the guarantees has been oﬀered by
the theory￿s proponents. Our own data (discussed below) show redemption rates of
5% or less for most price-matching ￿rms in an illustrative sample and much lower for
some price-matching ￿rms in the sample.6
This paper examines the incentives for price matching guarantees generated by
4For example, Hess and Gerstner (1991)￿s study of grocery stores in the Raleigh, North Carolina
market found a 1.6% increase in market prices when one of the supermarkets adopted a price-
matching policy. Given that the supermarkets in question collectively had 92% of the market, and
the products in question are largely staples, this price increase seems too small to suggest a cartel.
5A r b a t s k a y a ,H v i i d ,a n dS h a ﬀer (1999) examine advertised tire prices across the U.S., and ￿nd a
statistically signi￿cant lower price for dealers oﬀering low-price guarantees (although only for price-
beating dealers; for price-matching dealers the results are inconclusive). Second, consumers believe
that price-matching ￿rms are lower priced than non-price-matching ￿rms (Jain and Srivastava 2000;
Srivastava and Lurie 2001). These papers report results from simulated shopping experiments where
consumers were asked about their perceptions of, and shopping preferences between, price-matching
and non-price-matching stores. They ￿nd that (1) subjects perceive price-matching stores to be
lower priced than non-price-matching stores, (2) they are more likely to choose to shop at price-
matching stores than at non-price-matching stores, and (3) they are more likely to stop searching,
by as much as 25 percent, after they have been to a price-matching store than after they have been
to a non-price-matching store. Consumers can be wrong, of course, but in general the observed
behaviour of economic agents deserves some weight.
6For other theories of price-matching see Hviid and Shaﬀer (1999), Jain and Srivastava (2000)
and Chen, Narasimhan and Zhang (2001).
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mation about prices is costly (Stigler 1961, Salop and Stiglitz 1977). These costs,
which vary across consumers, are interpreted very generally as the costs of obtaining,
organizing and memorizing information on the prices of hundreds of products oﬀered
at diﬀerent retailers. Our second assumption is that, unlike prices, a ￿rm￿s pricing
policy￿whether it oﬀers a price-matching guarantee or not￿is easily observed by
consumers. The third assumption is that ￿rms are heterogenous in a way that is
re￿e c t e di nv a r i e t yi no p t i m a lp r i c e s .
We propose that price matching guarantees are a credible way to communicate
to high information-cost consumers that ￿we are a low-priced outlet.￿ This signal
is valuable to the ￿rm because it increases the ￿rm￿s demand. The signal is credible
because of the vigilance of the low time-cost consumers, the consumers who are di-
rectly informed about prices. Where optimal prices vary across ￿rms, a high-priced
store that oﬀered a price-match guarantee would be delegating its pricing decision
for informed consumers to its rival. It would thus be forced to oﬀer a low (and
suboptimal) price to informed consumers.
By directing busy consumers towards low-priced ￿rms, price matching allows the
low prices induced in the market by low-time-cost customers to be shared by busy
customers. Thus price matching guarantees can facilitate the positive search exter-
nalities that active shoppers provide in markets with imperfect consumer information
and transactions costs. This is the opposite of Edlin￿s argument that price matching
limits the extent of these externalities.
We start our analysis of price-matching guarantees by re-examining the cartel-
facilitating theory of price matching in a traditional duopoly model with homogeneous
products and zero transactions costs. We then add, in sequence: product diﬀeren-
tiation (or travel costs), consumer heterogeneity in price information costs, and ￿rm
heterogeneity in optimal pricing. Surprisingly, the explanation of price-matching as
a facilitating device is strengthened under some conditions along this path. The
full set of assumptions, however, supports our theory of price-matching as conveying
information about prices. We contrast the testable implications that emerge from
our theory with those ￿owing from the two theories of price matching as anticompet-
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of retailers. In the conclusion, we discuss a Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) paradox that
emerges when one endogenizes consumers￿ choices between active shopping, investing
in information about prices, and inference shopping, relying solely on announced price
policies in decisions about where to shop.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Assumptions
We list at the outset the full set of assumptions of our model. This is the simplest set
of assumptions that supports our theory of price matching as information conveyance.
W ew i l li n v o k ev a r i o u ss u b s e t so ft h e s ea s s u m p t i o n sa sw er e e x a m i n et h et r a d i t i o n a l
theory of price matching as a facilitating device and extend it, in steps, to markets
where consumers face information costs.
1. Two ￿rms, located at opposite ends of a unit line segment, compete in prices
for the sale of a physically identical product.
2. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the line segment, with unit density.
A consumer￿s location is indexed by s.
3. Consumers bear a common travel cost, t, that is independent of the quantity
purchased.
4. Consumers have a common, quasi-linear utility, u(q)+e,w h e r eq is the amount
of the product consumed and e is expenditure on other goods. u(.) is strictly
increasing and concave. Travel costs are independent of q, so the net surplus for
ac o n s u m e ra ts travelling to, say, ￿rm 1 and purchasing at price p is v(p) − st
where v(•) is the indirect utility function corresponding to u(•).W e a s s u m e
that v(0) is ￿nite. A consumer￿s demand function upon reaching a ￿rm is
q(p)=−v0(p).
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probability λ and cH with probability (1 − λ); cL <c H.
6. After the simultaneous realization of costs, observed by both ￿rms, the ￿rms
simultaneously decide whether or not to announce price-matching guarantees.
A price-matching guarantee means that any consumer of a ￿rm who has infor-
mation as to the price charged by the other ￿r mc a no b t a i nt h es a m ep r i c ea t
the price-matching ￿rm. After the price-matching guarantee decisions, ￿rms
simultaneously decide on list prices.
7. A fraction α of the consumers at any location are uninformed about the list
prices charged at the ￿rms.7 The remaining fraction, 1 − α, are informed
about list prices. Price-matching guarantees, however, are observed by all con-
sumers.8
8. After prices are decided upon, consumers decide from which ￿rm to purchase.
Uninformed consumers condition their expectations of prices at the two ￿rms
on the ￿rms￿ price-matching decisions, and purchase where their expected con-
sumer surplus net of transportation costs is higher. Once inside a store, they
pay list prices. With respect to informed consumers, we must distinguish be-
tween list prices and transaction prices. The transaction price at a store that
has announced price-matching is, for informed consumers, the minimum of its
list price and the list price of its rival; the transaction price at a store that has
not announced price matching is its list price.
9. When α =0 ,t o t a lp r o ￿ts are concave in the common price charged by both
￿rms, and individual pro￿t functions satisfy strategic complementarity, and the
contraction-mapping property.9
7We emphasize that we are exploring the consequences of costly price information, but do not
e x p l a i ni nt h em o d e lwhy this information is costly. In reality, there are thousands of retail prices
to keep track of at each outlet and price information costs are largely the time costs of organizing
and retaining this information; in our model, however, each store sells a single product at a single
price.
8In keeping with the assumption of bounded consumer rationality, we assume that consumers can
remember only whether or not a ￿rm has announced that it will at least match prices. Price beating
policies, such as ￿we will refund 110 percent of any price diﬀerence￿ are therefore not considered.
9 This regularity condition on the demand functions is extended to the case of α>0 below,
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To develop the theory of price-matching guarantees as supporting cartel pricing con-
sider two ￿rms selling an identical product with identical costs, c, which decide si-
multaneously whether to announce price-matching guarantees prior to competing in
prices. In terms of the above set of assumptions, t =0 , α =0and the distribution
of costs is degenerate at c.L e t m denote the monopoly price given demand q(p) for
the product, and let ￿PM￿ and ￿no-PM￿ refer to decisions to announce PM and not
to announce PM, respectively.
Proposition 1 If t =0 , α =0and cL = cH ≡ c,t h e ni nt h es u b g a m ef o l l o w i n g
{PM,PM}, any p ∈ [c,m] can be supported as the Nash equilibrium transaction (and
list) price for both ￿rms. For the entire game, the set of subgame-perfect Nash
equilibria includes PM adopted by both ￿rms, PM adopted by only one ￿rm, and PM
adopted by neither ￿rm.
The ￿rst part of this proposition follows from the facts that if each ￿rm chooses
p ∈ [c,m] as its list price, following {PM, PM}, then neither has a positive incentive
to increase its list price since this will leave its transaction price unchanged; and either
￿rm would lose by dropping its list price because this would decrease the transaction
prices of both ￿rms.10 The only equilibrium of the pricing subgame following {no-
PM, no-PM} is clearly the Bertrand equilibrium (c,c). Following PM by only one ￿rm
(say, Firm 1), the best response of Firm 2 to any p1 ∈ [c,m] is to match p1:a b o v ep1,
Firm 2 faces payoﬀsf r o m(p1,p 2) identical to those of the unrestricted Bertrand game
and will therefore not price higher than p1 under Assumption 9, and Firm 2 will not
after the introduction of necessary concepts. Strategic complementarity means that each ￿rm￿s
best response is a strictly increasing function of its rival￿s price; the contraction mapping property
is that the slope of the reaction function is strictly less than 1. The conditions on demand that
are suﬃcient for these properties are the following: Given the parameters t,cL,and q(•):for all







ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ >
∂ lnD1(p1,p2;su)





ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ >
∂2 lnD1(p1,p2;su)
∂p1∂p2 and similarly for
the demand facing Firm 2.
10 In addition, the pair of transactions prices {m,m} can be supported by a Nash equilibrium in
which one ￿rm sets a list price m and the other ￿rm sets any list price above m.
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its rival. Firm 1, however, will always undercut any price higher than c on the part
of Firm 2. Therefore (c,c) is the only equilibrium of this pricing subgame, as well.
From this characterization of the equilibria in the subgames, it follows that {PM,PM}
is part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (e.g. the equilibrium in which (m,m)
follows {PM, PM}). The action pairs {no-PM, PM} and {PM, no-PM} are supported
as actions of one subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium by the selection of (c,c) as the
equilibrium of the pricing subgame following {PM, PM}. This selection leaves neither
￿rm with the incentive to match a PM strategy. Finally, the pair {no-PM, no-PM}
is part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (whatever the equilibrium selected for
the pricing subgame under {PM, PM}) since a unilateral move by one ￿rm to PM
h a sn oi m p a c to ns u b s e q u e n tp r i c e s .
Thus, if we restrict ourselves to the conventional equilibrium concept, subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium, the claim that cartel pricing can be supported by price-
matching guarantees ￿nds relatively weak formal support. It is one possible outcome
of the appropriate game, but only one. Decisions on the part of both ￿rms to refrain
from price-matching is always an equilibrium. Moreover, even when price matching
is adopted by both ￿rms, it may be followed by the competitive, Bertrand prices that
would emerge without price matching.11
2.3 Price matching with product diﬀerentiation
The extension to product diﬀerentiation is captured by a single change in assumptions:
let t>0. Spatial models are often used to represent product diﬀerentiation in general
(Eaton and Lipsey (1989)). In our context of retail markets, we have in mind a literal
interpretation of travel costs, with the location of a consumer representing the relative
11 The multiplicity of equilbria under price matching was pointed out, ￿rst, we believe, by Chen
(1995) in a model with no product diﬀerentiation, no heterogeneity among ￿rms, and perfectly
informed consumers. He invokes a re￿nement of Nash equilibrium to support monopoly pricing
as the only equilibrium, as we will do, but he uses a forward induction argument rather than
our approach, which uses trembling-hand perfection. The elimination of other equilibria in Chen￿s
model requires both another transaction cost￿that ￿rms incur a ￿xed cost in announcing a low price
guarantee￿and the assumption that ￿rms can implement price-beating guarantees just as easily as
price-matching guarantees.
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good. Retail shopping is not costless and it is natural to ask how these costs aﬀect
the use of price matching guarantees as a facilitating device.
Proposition 2 If t>0, α =0and cL = cH ≡ c, then in the subgames following
no-PM by at least one ￿rm, the unique Nash equilibrium has both ￿rms listing the
Bertrand price pB,w h i c hs a t i s ￿es c<p B <m . In the subgame following {PM,
PM}, any p ∈ [c,m] can be supported as the Nash equilibrium transaction (and list)
price for both ￿rms. For the entire game, the set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
includes PM adopted by both ￿rms, PM adopted by only one ￿rm, and PM adopted
by neither ￿rm.
The proposition reads identically to Proposition 1, except that t>0,a n dt h e
proof is the same. But in this case of product diﬀerentiation, price matching carries
the threat to the ￿rms of making the market more competitive: the equilibrium
list price in the subgame following {PM, PM} could be less than pB, the Bertrand
price without any price matching whatsoever. The threat of greater competition can
rationally￿i.e., as part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium￿deter a ￿rm from matching
its rival￿s PM strategy. Product diﬀerentiation introduces the ￿strategic uncertainty￿
that PM can lead to more intense competition, weakening the power of price matching
as a facilitating device.
To the extent, however, that one is willing to trust a re￿nement of the sub-game
equilibrium concept, the theory of PM as a facilitating device is sustained. Suppose
that in the subgame under {PM, PM}, in either the traditional case or the product
diﬀerentiation case, we assume that an individual player is unsure of which price its
rival going to play. Contrary to the assumptions of Nash equilibrium, the player does
not know with certainty which action the rival is going to take but instead perceives
the rival as having a ￿trembling hand,￿ setting each price with positive probability.
Then each player would adopt the monopoly price as its list price: whatever the
realization of its rival￿s strategy, the player is never worse oﬀ by adopting m rather
than any other price b p, since if the rival￿s price is below b p the rival￿s price determines
the same transactions price for both ￿rms whether m or b p is played whereas if the
rival￿s price is above b p, then the play of m ensures a higher set of transactions prices
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a Nash equilibrium be robust in this sense is captured by the re￿nement of ￿normal
form trembling￿hand perfection￿.12 In a trembling￿hand perfect equilibrium, the
(m,m) price pair is ensured following price matching by both players since m is the
only price that is not weakly dominated.
Moving up the game tree to the price matching decisions requires another appli-
cation of trembling￿hand perfection. The pair of actions in which neither player is
adopting PM is part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium since unilateral adoption
of PM has no impact on payoﬀs. Again, however, the attribution to each player
of the anticipation of a ￿tremble￿ on the part of the rival leads to {PM,PM} as the
predicted outcome since no-PM is for each player weakly dominated by PM. In sum:
Proposition 3 If α =0 ,t≥ 0, and cL = cH ≡ c , the only trembling￿hand perfect
equilibrium in the pricing subgame following {PM,PM} is (m,m). The normal-form
trembling￿hand perfect equilibrium for the entire game yields {PM,PM} and (m,m).
2.4 Price matching with uninformed consumers
The next transaction cost ingredient along the path towards our full set of assumptions
is heterogeneous consumer information about prices. We now assume α ∈ (0,1):
some consumers are uninformed about prices. While uninformed consumers do not
observe prices, they can observe the price-matching policy of the ￿rm. This captures
in extreme form the ease with which price-matching policies are observed relative to
prices. We shall see that even an arbitrarily small number of uninformed consumers
strengthens the facilitating-device theory of price-matching guarantees. Whereas the
prediction of cartel pricing following price-matching previously required a re￿nement
of the Nash equilibrium concept, with even a small number of uninformed consumers,
this outcome arises as an equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies.
12 De￿ne a totally-mixed strategy as a mixed strategy that puts positive probability on each
element in a strategy set. A normal form trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is a strategy pair
(σ1,σ2) that is the limit of some sequence (σn
1,σn
2) of totally mixed strategies with σi being a best
response to σn
j for all n and j 6= i (Selten 1975).
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tions. Informed consumers choose stores based on their list prices and on their price-
matching policies; uninformed consumers choose stores based on their expectations of
list prices at the two stores (which can be a function of the observed price-matching
policies). The uninformed consumers￿ price expectations result in a marginal un-
informed consumer, su. Uninformed consumers to the left of su buy from Firm 1;
uninformed consumers to the right of su buy from Firm 2. It is important to note
that at the stage of the game when the two ￿rms compete in prices, each is taking its
set of uninformed consumers as an exogenous endowment, over which it has monopoly
power.
Suppose neither ￿rm oﬀers a price-matching guarantee. Then list prices and
transaction prices are the same for everyone. Given list prices (p1,p 2), the demand
facing Firm 1 is given by
D1(p1,p 2;su)=[ ( 1− α)sI(p1,p 2)+αsu] • q(p1) (1)
where sI(p1,p 2) ≡ (1/2) + [v(p1) − v(p2)]/2t is the marginal informed consumer.
Note that the elasticity of demand ￿owing from the uninformed consumers is solely
from q(.),t h emarket demand. All consumers who purchase from a particular ￿rm
purchase the same amount, by Assumption 4. We denote pro￿ts as π1(p1,p 2;su)=
(p1−c1)D1(p1,p 2;su). It is also convenient to de￿ne πI
1(p1,p 2)=( p1−c1)sI(p1,p 2)q(p1)
as Firm 1￿s pro￿ts per unit density of informed consumers. Similarly πU
1 (p1;su)=
(p1 − c1)suq(p1) so that π1(p1,p 2;su)=απU
1 (p1;su)+( 1− α)πI
1(p1,p 2).
If both ￿rms oﬀer price-matching guarantees, then Firm 1￿s demand function is
D1(p1,p 2;su)=( 1− α)(1/2)q(min(p1,p 2)) + αsuq(p1) (2)
In this case, π1(p1,p 2;su)=απU
1 (p1;su)+( 1− α)πI
1(min(p1,p 2),min(p1,p 2)).
Finally, if Firm 1 is the only one to oﬀer a price-matching guarantee, then its




[(1 − α)sI(p1,p 2)+αsu] • q(p1) if p1 ≤ p2
(1 − α)sI(p2,p 2)q(p2)+αsuq(p1) if p1 >p 2
(3)
10
12 Review of Marketing Science Working Papers Vol. 2 [2002], No. 1, Article 2
http://www.bepress.com/roms/vol2/iss1/paper2In the region p1 ≤ p2, Firm 1￿s demand function is the same as its demand func-
tion when neither ￿rm oﬀers a price-matching guarantee, and its pro￿t function is
π1(p1,p 2;su)=απU
1 (p1;su)+(1−α)πI
1(p1,p 2).I n t h e r e g i o n p1 >p 2, Firm 1￿s pro￿t
function is π1(p1,p 2;su)=απU
1 (p1;su)+( 1− α)πI
1(p2,p 2).
Firm 2￿s demand and pro￿t functions are de￿ned analogously.
To characterize the pricing outcomes, we ￿rst extend the regularity assumptions
on demand (Assumption 9) to the price games induced by arbitrary su:
9A. The demand functions conditional upon arbitrary su yield total pro￿ts that
are concave in a common price charged by both ￿rms, and individual pro￿t
functions that satisfy strategic complementarity and the contraction-mapping
property.13
Proposition 4 If α>0 and cL = cH ≡ c (whether t =0or t>0), then in the
subgame following {PM,PM}, (m,m) is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies is the strongest form of prediction in
game theory, stronger in particular than Nash equilibrium in that it relies simply on
the assumption that each player chooses a strategy that guarantees strictly higher
payoﬀs than any other strategy (regardless of the strategy chosen by its rival). With
α>0, following {PM,PM}, each ￿rm￿s payoﬀ now includes both the payoﬀ from
selling to informed consumers in competition with the other ￿rm, as well as the pay-
oﬀ as a monopolist selling to half of the α uninformed consumers. The price m is
a weakly dominant strategy with respect to the game played for the demand of in-
formed consumers, but is a strictly dominant strategy with respect to the uninformed
consumers. Adding the payoﬀs from selling to the two groups of consumers yields m
as a strictly dominant strategy, for arbitrarily small α, proving the proposition.
This result contrasts sharply with Hviid and Shaﬀer (1999) who argue that even
an epsilon amount of transactions costs of a diﬀerent kind￿costs of redeeming a
13 The conditions that must be satis￿ed by the demand functions are given in footnote 7. These
have been veri￿ed for a wide range of numerical parameters for the model, but are violated in some
ranges, where only mixed strategy equilibria exist. In considering the range of parameters where
payoﬀs are well-behaved, we follow a long tradition in the economics of spatial models (see Eaton
and Lipsey (1989)).
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lusive pricing to marginal cost pricing.14 The mere presence of an epsilon of high-
transactions cost consumers in our model serves to strengthen, not weaken, the cartel-
facilitating role of price-matching in that it eliminates completely the coordination
problem that arises when there is a continuum of equilibria between marginal cost and
monopoly price. As a general matter, the impact of even an arbitrarily small amount
of transactions costs on market organization can be very sensitive to the nature of
the transactions costs.
2.5 Price matching as information provision
The ￿nal ingredient in our transactions cost theory is ￿rm heterogeneity. Any source
of ￿rm heterogeneity that leads to diﬀerences in optimal prices across ￿rms will do.
Possible sources of heterogeneity in reality include vertical diﬀerentiation, e.g., choice
of an up-market location versus an inconvenient but low-rent location, a diﬀerence in
the service levels provided by stores, or cost diﬀerences between ￿rms. The key is
that whatever the source of heterogeneity, a high-priced ￿rm would ￿nd it costly to
delegate its pricing decision to a low-priced ￿rm because their interests diﬀer. Price-
matching inherently involves delegation of the decision on transaction prices to the
￿rm that is, in equilibrium, lower priced. Market conditions that make it costly for
a high-priced store to delegate its transaction prices to a low-priced store means that
a high-priced store will not mimic the price-matching behavior of a low-priced store,
and thus provide some foundation for a theory of price-matching as signaling low
prices. We adopt the simplest source of such market conditions, namely a random
diﬀerence in the unit cost of the two ￿rms.
We thus have the full set of assumptions laid out at the beginning of this sec-
14 When ￿rms sell undiﬀerentiated products even a penny of consumer transactions cost in re-
deeming a price-matching oﬀer is enough to allow a ￿rm pro￿tably to undercut the prevailing price,
making the entire collusive arrangement unravel. This is because consumers, having observed an
undercutting ￿rm, would prefer to buy from the undercutting ￿rm rather than incur the transaction
cost of invoking his or her rights under the price-matching guarantee at the higher priced store.
This argument, however, depends upon ￿rms being completely identical from the perspective of
each consumer and hence is ruled out if one recognizes an additional transaction-cost based feature
of retail markets, that a consumer ￿nds some stores more convenient to shop at than others.
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assumptions. The equilibrium consists of price match and pricing strategies (for
￿rms) that are rational given expectations of uninformed consumers; purchase deci-
sions of informed and uninformed consumers that are rational given the expectations
of the uninformed consumers; and an expectational distribution of prices for each
uninformed consumer, as to the price set by each ￿rm, given the ￿rms￿ observable
price-matching decisions, that satis￿es Bayes￿ law (along the equilibrium path of the
game) given the equilibrium price-match decisions by ￿rms and the probability λ.
The equilibrium that we have described cannot be solved for via backwards in-
duction since there are no proper subgames (subgames not linked by uninformed
consumers￿ information sets).15 However, the simple demand structure of the model
provides an approach to solving the game, which involves ￿nding expectations that
are self-realizing.
Consider an arbitrary set of price expectations on the part of uninformed con-
sumers, i.e., an expected price at each outlet for each combination of price-match
decisions. Let b V =( b v00,b v01,b v10,b v11) represent the surplus expected from Firm 1 by
each uninformed consumer, gross of transportation costs, in each of the consumer￿s
information sets. b v01, for example, is the consumer￿s expected surplus following the
consumer￿s observation that Firm 1 has not announced price-matching and Firm 2 has
announced price-matching. Expected surplus from Firm 2 is given symmetrically.
These expectations determine a partition of the set of uninformed consumers,
some going to Firm 1, the others to Firm 2. This partition, in turn, determines for
each ￿rm a measure of ￿captive￿ uninformed consumers, each with demand q(p),o v e r
which the ￿rm has monopoly power: uninformed consumers have rational price ex-
pectations in equilibrium but do not respond, in their decisions of where to shop, to
(oﬀ-equilibrium) changes in a ￿rm￿s price. Let (i,j) represent the pair of price match-
ing decisions, with i =1if Firm 1 has announced price-matching, etc. Following
symmetric price-match decisions by the two ￿rms, the partition is [0,1/2] and [1/2,1];
following asymmetric price-match decisions, such as (1,0), the partition is [0,b su] and
[b su,1], where b su, the marginal uninformed consumer, satis￿es b v10−b sut = b v01−(1−b su)t,
15 By contrast, in the previous section, the pricing subgames were proper subgames because
consumers there were as as well-informed about the ￿rms￿ costs as the ￿rms themselves.
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2 +( b v10 − b v01)/2t. The impact of the game￿s history at the point of simul-
taneous decisions on prices is summarized by these captive consumers, as well as
by which of the two ￿rms are competing under the constraint of a binding price-
matching agreement. We refer to the pricing game that is induced by an arbitrary
set of expectations as an induced price game.
Consider the induced price games generated by the expectations vector b V for a
given pair of cost realizations. For each pair of price-match decisions, our assumptions
guarantee a unique equilibrium in the induced price game. These equilibria, in turn,
de￿ne a set of payoﬀsf o re a c h￿rm for each pair of price-match decisions. The
mapping from pairs of price-match decisions to payoﬀs determines the equilibrium
price-match decisions of each ￿rm given a pair of cost realizations. Extending this
procedure to each pair of cost realizations, a mapping from pairs of cost realizations
to pairs of equilibrium price-match decisions, and, ￿nally, to pairs of equilibrium
price distributions is de￿ned. This mapping, in conjunction with λ, determines a
set of ￿actual￿ expected surpluses at each ￿rm for the uninformed consumers. In
other words, this procedure de￿nes an operator Φ,v i aΦ(b V )=V , on the possible
set of surplus expectations in R4.A￿xed point of Φ, V ∗, yields a Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the entire game.
In fact, the ￿xed-point problem admits an even simpler representation. Given that
what matters at the price competition stage is the marginal uninformed consumer
determined by the uninformed consumers￿ expectations, the ￿xed-point problem is
to ￿nd an b su such that the vector of marginal consumers following the four possible
combinations of price match decisions, (1/2,1−b su,b su,1/2), induces price games that
rationalize this vector. In other words, the task is to ￿nd price-matching decisions
and pricing decisions that are individually rational for the ￿rms given an b su,a n d
w h i c hi nt u r ngenerate b su as rational on the part of consumers.16
W es h a l ls h o wt h a ti ti sp o s s i b l et o￿nd a b su > 1/2 t h a th a st h i sp r o p e r t y .T h a t
is, we will show that uninformed consumers expecting to pay equal prices at the two
￿rms following symmetric price-matching decisions, and a lower price at the price-
matching ￿rm following asymmetric price-matching decisions, can be rational given
16 The summary of expectations by a single parameter, in the search for self-realizing expectations,
allows us to use the simplest of all ￿xed-point theorems, namely the intermediate value theorem.
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Induced price games
Figure 1 depicts the game tree in a substantially summarized form. At the top of
the tree, nature draws random costs for each ￿rm from {cL,c H}. The four possibilities
are summarized in the diagram by the outcomes of symmetric costs (c1 = c2), and
t h ea s y m m e t r i cc o s to u t c o m e sc1 <c 2 and c1 >c 2. Following the cost realization,
￿rms make price-match decisions, which then result in expectations that induce a
vector (1/2,1 − b su,b su,1/2). The price games following price match decisions (1,0)
are grouped in an ￿information set,￿ which (again, in summary form) corresponds
not to the information of players taking decisions at the nodes in the set but rather
to the information of consumers. Consumers cannot distinguish among these three
nodes. The price games in this information set are induced by the same su > 1/2,
the single parameter summarizing consumer expectations; the remaining price games
depicted in the diagram follow symmetric price-match choices and are induced by
su =1 /2. After a symmetric cost realization, it is enough to keep track of three
price-match histories: both ￿rms choose 1,b o t hc h o o s e0,o ro n l yo n e￿rm (say,
￿rm 1) chooses 1. After asymmetric cost realizations, however, we must keep track
of both asymmetric price match decisions, (1,0) and (0,1). In sum, there are ten
induced price games that must be solved for. Symmetry allows us to reduce these to
the eight games labelled 1 through 8 in Figure 1.
We discuss the equilibria in the induced price games in the following order, in
pairs: {1, 4}, {2, 7}, {3, 5}, {6, 8}. The induced price game at node 1 is simply
the Bertrand game with symmetric costs and su =1 /2. The equilibrium price is
between cost and the monopoly price; it re￿ects the endowment by each ￿rm of half
of the captive (uninformed) consumers. The equilibrium at node 4 is also a Bertrand
equilibrium, conditional upon su =1 /2, but with asymmetric costs.
The games at node 2 and node 7 are also induced by su =1 /2. At node 2, we get
cartel pricing, (m,m). In fact this is a dominant strategy equilibrium per Proposition
4. The equilibrium at node 7 also yield monopoly prices, (m1,m 2).A t t h i s n o d e ,
the low-cost ￿rm, Firm 1, sets its monopoly price as its list price since this maximizes
both its pro￿ts from informed consumers (for which this ￿rm has been eﬀectively
15
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Figure 1: Summary of price-matching game
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high-cost ￿rm, Firm 2, delegates its pricing for informed consumers to the low-cost
￿rm, and simply sets its own (higher) monopoly price as its list price for uninformed
consumers. Firm 2 has no incentive to reduce its price within the range (m1,m 2)
since this only lowers its pro￿ts from uninformed consumers, and has no incentive
to lower its price below m1 since this price drop would be automatically matched by
Firm 1 with a consequent drop in Firm 2￿s pro￿ts.
Turning now to node 3, if su ≥ 1/2, only a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists with
support [pB
1 (su),m].T o s e e t h i s , n o t e ￿rst that Firm 2￿s transaction price for all con-
sumers is its list price. Its best response function is BR2(p)=p for all p ∈ [pB,m]
where pB is the Bertrand equilibrium price that would set in a price game induced
by the same su but without price-matching. This is because (a) Firm 2 knows that
any price cut below p will be automatically matched for its informed consumers by
Firm 1, and since π2(p,p) is decreasing in p in this range such undercutting does not
pay; and (b) under the regularity conditions (9A) on demand, π2(p,p2) is decreasing
in p2 for p2 ≥ p ≥ pB so responding with a price p2 >pwould not be pro￿table. (To
summarize (a) and (b), were it not for the price-match guarantee, it would pay Firm
2 to undercut any price p ∈ (pB,m] by Firm 1, but facing a price-match guarantee,
the best that Firm 2 can do is match Firm 1.) Firm 1￿s pro￿ts, however, are always
higher by setting m than by matching any price p less than m since by raising its price
to m Firm 1 collects maximum pro￿ts from the captive uninformed consumers with-
out aﬀecting its price p (obtained under the price-matching guarantee) to informed
consumers. It follows that the only possible pure strategy equilibrium is (m,m).
But this pair is not an equilibrium: BR1(m) <mbecause the elasticity of D1 at
(m,m) exceeds the elasticity of the demand curve q(p) (as seen from equation (1));
i.e. it pays Firm 1 to undercut Firm 2 at this price pair.
A mixed strategy equilibrium exists per Glicksberg￿s (1952) theorem since the
payoﬀ functions of the ￿rms are continuous. Using a conventional argument, we can
show that under the regularity assumptions on demand, the strategy subset [0,p B) can
be eliminated through iterated strict dominance.17 Moreover for Firm 2, (m,∞] is
17 To prove that the strategy subsets [0,p B
1 ) and [0,p B
2 ) can be eliminated through iterated strict
dominance under the price game following price-matching by Firm 1 only, note ￿rst that these subsets
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and similarly for Firm 1. Thus only the strategy subset [pB,m] for each player
survives iterated elimination of strictly dominant strategies. The supports of mixed
strategy equilibrium strategies are always contained within strategy sets surviving
the iterated elimination of strictly dominant strategies. In sum, the induced price
game at node 3 yields a mixed strategy equilibrium with supports in [pB,m].
At node 5, if su ≥ 1/2,n o t e￿rst that pB
1 may or may not be greater than pB
2 :
su ≥ 1/2 encourages pB
1 >p B
2 while c1 <c 2 encourages pB
1 <p B
2 . If pB
1 <p B
2 , there are
two possibilities for an equilibrium: a pure-strategy equilibrium or a mixed-strategy
equilibrium. If a pure strategy equilibrium exists, it is the same as the asymmetric-
cost Bertrand equilibrium in node 4. But a pure-strategy equilibrium will not exist
if Firm 1￿s best response to pB
2 (su) is to raise its list price to m1, thus charging the
monopoly price to its share of uninformed consumers and leaving the transaction
price for its informed consumers at pB
2 (>p B
1 ). The condition determining whether
can be eliminated through iterated strict dominance of the unconstrained pricing game because under
the regularity conditions in assumption 9A, this game has a unique Bertrand equilibrium and satis￿es
strategic complementarity. The results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) imply that in any strategic
complementarity (more generally, supermodular) game with a unique equilibrium, the equilibrium
can be solved via iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Next, the same iterated
elimination procedure eliminating the strategy subsets [0,p B
1 ) and [0,p B
2 ) in the unconstrained pricing
game continue to hold in the game following price-matching by Firm 1 only. For Firm 2, if a
particular interval [0,P 2] is eliminated from Firm 2￿s strategy set because any p ∈ [0,P 2] is dominated
by some b p>P 2,t h e nb p continues to dominate p in the price-game following price-matching by Firm
1, because raising price from p to b p now not only increase￿s Firm 2￿s own price but possibly its rival￿s
price as well. To make the analogous argument for Firm 1, let p ∈ [0,P 1] is dominated by some
b p>P 1.R a i s i n g p r i c e f r o m p to b p is still dominant against any p2 <psince this would increase
price for the uninformed consumers while leaving the price for the informed consumers unchanged;
if raising price to b p were pro￿table in the unconstrained game, an increase to this price must be
pro￿table for only the uninformed consumers. Raising price from p to b p is dominant against any
p2 > b p is pro￿table since over this range the pro￿t of Firm 1 is unaﬀected by the price-match
constraint. Finally, consider any p2 ∈ [p, b p]. Raising price from p to p2 is pro￿table for Firm 1 in
the unconstrained game because assumption 9A ensures the concavity of pro￿ts in price for Firm 1
in this game; the same increase is pro￿table in the price-match game since over this range Firm 1￿s
pro￿ts are unaﬀected by the constraint. Raising price further from p2 to b p is pro￿table since this
increase has no eﬀect on the price paid by informed consumers but does increase the price paid by
uninformed consumers. Thus p continues to dominated by b p in the price-match game. Since the
iteration of strictly dominant strategies eliminates [0,p B
1 ) and [0,p B
2 ) in the unconstrained game, it
eliminates these sets in the pricing game following price-match by Firm 1 only.
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The ￿rst term on the right hand side of this inequality is greater than the ￿rst term on
the left hand side; Firm 1 gains pro￿ts from the uninformed consumers by raising its
price. But the second term decreases moving from the left hand side to the right hand
side: pB
2 >p B
1 , and the best response to pB
2 with respect to πI
1 is less than pB
1 (which is
the best response with respect to π1) since the demand from informed consumers alone
is more elastic than the total demand. The inequality is satis￿ed if α is suﬃciently
small or the cost diﬀerence, cH − cL, is suﬃciently large. Since small α and large
cost diﬀerences will be required for our main proposition, we focus on the case where
condition (4) is satis￿ed.18 (If condition (4) is violated, then only a mixed strategy
equilibrium with supports [pB
1 (su),m 1] and [pB
2 (su),max(m1,BR 2(m1))] exists.)
Finally, at node 6, where only Firm 2, the high-cost ￿rm, oﬀers a price-matching
guarantee, pB
1 <p B
2 when su ≤ 1/2. The equilibrium when su ≤ 1/2 may involve the
monopoly prices (m1,m 2) that arise when both ￿rms oﬀer price-matching. Clearly,
Firm 1 has no incentive to deviate at these prices. Firm 2, however, may have
an incentive to undercut m1: Firm 2￿s pro￿t at its (Bertrand) best response to
m1 may exceed its pro￿t from accepting transaction prices m1 and m2 in response
to m1. In this case, only a mixed strategy equilibrium with supports [pB
2 (su),m 1]
and [pB
2 (su),m 2] exists. Similarly for node 8 with su ≥ 1/2. This completes the
characterization of equilibria in the induced price games.
Equilibrium price-match decisions
Suppose su =1 /2 at node 3 (as well as at nodes 1 and 2) in Figure 1. By
Proposition 4, now both ￿rms will choose price-matching in a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium. In other words, node 3 will not be reached in equilibrium under su =1 /2.
The same applies when su > 1/2 at node 3: now Firm 2, by adopting price matching,
can increase its share of captive consumers from less than 1/2 to 1/2.
If su > 1/2 following (1,0), then the information set drawn is also not reached
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and (1,1); this induced price game yields equilibrium prices (m1,m 2) just as node 7
does, but at node 9, m2 <m 1. At node 8, as argued above, there are two possibilities
for the price equilibrium: a pure-strategy equilibrium (m1,m 2), or a mixed-strategy
equilibrium with supports [pB
1 (su),m 1] and [pB
2 (su),m 2]. In the former case, Firm 2￿s
pro￿ts are π2(m1,m 2;su > 1/2); in the latter case, they are less than π2(m1,m 2;su >
1/2) because there is a positive probability that Firm 1 will price below m2 when Firm
2 prices at m2. By matching Firm 1￿s price-match announcement and moving to node
9, Firm 2 ensures the prices (m1,m 2). In addition, it gains uninformed consumers.
Together these two eﬀects yield π2(m1,m 2;su =1 /2) >π 2(m1,m 2;su > 1/2). Node
8 is thus not reached in equilibrium if su > 1/2.
To ￿nd a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the entire game, it remains to show that
(a) at the single node, 5, remaining in the information set, self-ful￿lling expectations
on the part of the uninformed consumer can support a marginal uninformed consumer
su > 1/2; and (b) (1,0) is the optimal price-match decisions following a cost realization
in which Firm 1 alone has a low cost. To show (a), consider the marginal informed
consumer, sI, that results from the price game at node 5 by an arbitrary su,a n d
de￿ne the functional relationship between su and sI by sI = G(su).T o ￿nd self-
ful￿lling expectations, it is suﬃcient to ￿nd a ￿xed point s∗
u of G, i.e., a marginal
uniformed consumer that elicits an identical marginal informed consumer, since then
assigning as expectations to the uninformed consumers the prices that actually result
from s∗
u will result in prices that con￿rm these expectations.19 Stated diﬀerently, in
equilibrium, uninformed consumers infer the same prices that the informed consumers
observe. To this end, note that G is a strictly decreasing function, since a shift in the
share of captive consumers from Firm 1 to Firm 2 will lower p1 and raise p2 in the
induced price game, thus inducing more informed consumers to shop at Firm 1. Note
further that G is continuous and, since c1 <c 2, G(1/2) > 1/2. The three properties
of G suﬃce, by the intermediate value theorem, to show that G has a ￿xed point
s∗
u > 1/2.
The ￿nal ingredient is the demonstration that (1,0) can be individually rational
19 Here we take advantage of the assumption that informed and uninformed consumers have the
same travel cost, t.
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su > 1/2. In this case, as discussed above, a pure-strategy equilibrium (pB
1 (su),p B
2 (su))
exists when cH−cL is suﬃciently large and α is suﬃciently small. Firm 1, by choosing
price-matching, is responding optimally to no-price-matching on the part of Firm 2,
since the only impact of its price-match announcement is to attract more captive
consumers to a Bertrand price game. As for Firm 2, given c2 >> c1 and 1 − α ≈ 1,
Firm 2 will only lose pro￿ts by matching Firm 1.20 To see this, select an extreme cost
diﬀerence: suppose that the cost diﬀerence is so large that m1 <c 2.I n t h i s c a s e , b y
matching Firm 1￿s price-match announcement, Firm 2 causes its transaction price to
informed consumers to fall below its cost. If the proportion of informed consumers
is large, then Firm 2 clearly loses from this strategy. In sum:
Proposition 5 Under assumptions 1 to 9A, if cH − cL is suﬃciently large and α is
suﬃciently small, ceteris paribus, then a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium exists in which
under an asymmetric cost realization only the low-cost ￿rm adopts price matching.
The critical parameter separating the case of price-matching emerging as a strat-
egy signalling a low price from the role of price-matching as a cartel-facilitating device
is the cost diﬀerence in the two ￿rms. The logic of this proposition hinges on the dele-
gation aspect of price-matching: when invoked by a high-cost ￿rm, a price-matching
guarantee essentially delegates to the low-cost ￿rm the pricing decision for the in-
formed consumers. Such delegation has the attraction that the price will be set
closer to the cooperative level than the Bertrand price of the high-cost ￿rm. How-
ever, the cooperative price that the low-cost ￿rm sets will be its monopoly price.
When cost diﬀerences are large, this price may be too low for the high-cost ￿rm.
In contrast, by not oﬀering a price-matching guarantee, the high-cost ￿rm controls
its own destiny, albeit in a Bertrand game. So when the number of informed con-
sumers is large and the cost diﬀerence between the two ￿rms is large, uninformed￿but
rational￿consumers know that the behavior of informed consumers in invoking their
20 Now, there are clearly parameters in the model for which Firm 2 will respond by matching
Firm 1￿s price-match announcement. Speci￿cally, if the possible cost diﬀerence between the ￿rms
is suﬃciently small and the proportion of uninformed consumers is suﬃciently large, then the only
equilibrium is the collusive equilibrium (m1,m 2).
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matching guarantee. These consumers know, therefore, that the announcement of
price-matching signals a relatively low-cost, low-price ￿rm.
The proof of the proposition, as outlined, adopts an extreme cost diﬀerence, re-
sulting in m1 <c 2.A c o s t d i ﬀerence this large, however, is not necessary for the
equilibrium described to emerge. Moreover, we have in mind that the group of ￿rms
that are interacting strategically face some competition from possibly close substitutes
outside the model, i.e., q(p) is very elastic, so that even a moderate cost diﬀerence
brings the ￿monopoly￿ price of the low-cost ￿rm near the cost of the high-cost ￿rm.
Now that we have established that price-matching can play the role of signalling
a low price, the question arises as to the impact of price-matching on prices in the
market. The following proposition shows that, surprisingly, the impact of price-
matching, when it is used to signal a low price, is to increase the price of the ￿rm
adopting price-matching.
Proposition 6 Compared to the equilibrium of the game in which price-matching is
not allowed, the eﬀect of price-matching, when it is adopted in equilibrium by the
low-cost ￿rm only (following an asymmetric cost realization), is to increase the price
of the price-matching ￿rm and to decrease the price of the non price-matching ￿rm.
The proposition describes a second surprising eﬀect of price-matching. The impact
of adopting the practice is to decrease a rival￿s price. In the conventional model of
price-matching as a facilitating device the very point of a price-match announcement
by a ￿rm is to induce its competitors to maintain high prices. In our model, however,
uninformed, captive consumers are reallocated to the price-matching ￿rm in the move
from the non-price-matching game to the price-matching game. This leads to the
convergence of the two prices under price-matching relative to the non-price-matching
equilibrium because of the direct eﬀect of the respective changes in price elasticity
of demand caused by changes in the quantities of captive consumers (see equation
(1)). The direct eﬀect of the change in the own-elasticity of demand for each ￿rm is
mitigated, but not completely oﬀset, by the change in the rival￿s price under strategic
complementarity.
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information conveyed by the price-matching announcement on uninformed consumers￿
decisions of where, and if, to buy; and the eﬀect of the price changes on the purchases
of all consumers. The ￿rst of these impacts can only be a positive impact on overall
welfare since consumers shop under full information. The second impact on welfare is
mixed￿but being a price impact on welfare is only of second order. As the parametric
example in the following subsection illustrates, the overall welfare impact of price-
matching in this model is positive for a wide range of parameters. We caution,
however, that a third allocative eﬀect of price matching, its impact on consumers￿
incentive to invest in information about prices (i.e., to price shop) is missing in the
simple model. This eﬀect is discussed in the conclusion.
2.6 Example
Assume a linear demand function q(p)=1− p. Then v(p)=( 1 /2) − p + p2/2, and
the monopoly prices are
mL =0 .55,
mH =0 .77.
Let t =0 .2,α=0 .2,c L =0 .1, and cH =0 .54.
Suppose the cost realization is c1 =0 .1,c 2 =0 .54, and we are at node 5 in Figure 1
where only Firm 1 oﬀers a price-matching guarantee. The equilibrium in the induced
price game, given a su > 1/2, is simply the Bertrand prices when neither ￿rm oﬀers a
price-matching guarantee. The demand functions for the two ￿rms are given by (1),
and it is easy to see that the pro￿t functions satisfy Assumption 9A. The ￿rst-order
conditions de￿ning price choices yield cubic equations. Solved numerically, they yield
the Bertrand prices pB
1 (su),p B
2 (su) as functions of su. In turn, these Bertrand prices
de￿ne a mapping from su to sI via sI(su)=( 1 /2) + (v(pB
1 (su)) − v(pB
2 (su)))/2t.
We calculate the ￿xed point to be su =0 .809. The equilibrium (Bertrand) prices
are
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and the ￿rms charge these transactions prices to both informed and uninformed con-
sumers (Firm 1￿s price-matching guarantee has no force given that its list price is
lower). The two ￿rms￿ pro￿ts are calculated to be
π1 =0 .149,
π2 =9 .032 ￿ 10
−3.
Note that v(.417)−(.809)(.2) > 0:c o n s u m e r sa t0.809 would get a positive surplus
by traveling to Firm 1, a necessary condition for an equilibrium. In addition, we need
to check that neither ￿rm would want to deviate unilaterally to a diﬀerent price-
matching policy. Firm 1 would not want to withdraw its price-matching guarantee
because at node 4 Bertrand prices prevail once again but with fewer captive consumers
for Firm 1 (su =1 /2). Would Firm 2 deviate unilaterally to a price-matching policy?
Suppose it did. This will lead to the price game at node 7 with su =1 /2. At node 7,
as discussed previously, both ￿rms will list their respective monopoly prices, so Firm
2￿s uninformed consumers will pay mH =0 .77 and its informed consumers will pay
mL =0 .55. Its pro￿t, given su =1 /2, will be 7.09 ￿ 10−3, w h i c hi sl e s st h a nw h a ti t
gets at node 5. So Firm 2 will not deviate to a price-matching policy, and we have a
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Are consumers better oﬀ in this equilibrium vis-a-vis the situation where neither
￿rm oﬀers a price-matching guarantee? In the equilibrium, both informed and un-
informed consumers split between the two ￿rms according to su = sI =0 .809. The
prices are as given above, so aggregate consumer welfare is given by
•Z .809
0
(v(.417) − ts)ds +
Z 1
.809
(v(.695) − t(1 − s))ds
‚
=0 .077.
How does this compare to the situation when price-matching guarantees are not
allowed? Without price-matching guarantees, uninformed consumers have no basis
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and the ￿rms￿ prices are the Bertrand prices corresponding to su =1 /2.T h e s ep r i c e s
are pB
1 (.5) = .409,p B
2 (.5) = .709. The marginal uninformed consumer shopping at
Firm 2 ends up with negative overall surplus, v(.709)−(.5)(0.2) = −.058, even though
she expected positive surplus at each store a priori (provided λ>. 407). Note that the
informed consumers observe prices, and sI =( 1 /2) + (v(pB
1 (su)) − v(pB
2 (su)))/2t =




(v(.409) − t.s)ds +
Z 1
.5






(v(.409) − t.s)ds +
Z 1
.831
(v(.709) − t.(1 − s))ds
‚
=0 .0756.
In short, consumers are in aggregate better oﬀ with Firm 1 oﬀering a price-matching
guarantee compared to the situation where neither ￿rm is allowed to oﬀer a price-
matching guarantee.
3 Empirical Implications
How can we distinguish our signalling theory from the other two main theories in the
literature, collusion and price discrimination? The testable implications of the three
theories, as summarized in Table 1, are discussed and evaluated against existing and
new evidence in this section. To preview the ￿rst three implications, for example: the
observation of a signi￿cant proportion of consumers actually invoking price-matching
rights is consistent only with the price discrimination theory, and required by that
theory; the adoption of price matching by all ￿rms in the market is consistent only
with the collusion theory; the adoption of price matching only by the lowest priced
￿rms in the market is consistent only with the theory of price-matching as a signal
of low prices.
25
27 Moorthy and Winter: Price-Matching Guarantees
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012Implication Collusion Price Price-matching
theory discrimination as signal
1 Signi￿cant percentage of X X X
customers invoke PM rights
2 PM adopted by X X X
all ￿rms in the market
3 PM ￿rms are the X X X
lowest-priced in the market
4 PM increases prices X X X
of PM-adopting ￿rms
5 PM increases prices X X X
of non-PM-adopting ￿rms
6 PM pro￿table with X X X
large number of ￿rms
7 PM policy terminates ? X X
consumer search
8 PM adopted only by ￿rms X X X
with small market shares
Table 1: Summary of testable implications
The number of customers invoking price-matching rights
If price matching is used for the purpose of price discriminating, then a signi￿cant
number of customers must exercise their rights under the guarantee to obtain lower
prices from the price-matching ￿rm. Gateway, for example, would not incur the
expenses of an advertising campaign to advertise its price-matching guarantee in
order to oﬀer selective discounts to, say, 2 or 3 percent of its customers. On the
other hand, if price matching is a cartel coordinating device, then the guarantee of
matching discounts is a credible threat which the theory predicts will not be exercised
in equilibrium, and if price-matching is a signal of low prices, then its purpose is solely
as a credible signal that is costly for higher-priced (and higher cost) ￿rms to duplicate.
Since it is oﬀered by only the lowest-priced ￿rms in the market, the rights under the
guarantees are again not exercised. In short, the observation that none or very few
customers invoke the guarantee to obtain lower prices from the price-matching ￿rm
is consistent with the cartel theory and the signalling theory but not with the price
discrimination theory.
How many consumers redeem price-matching guarantees? Surprisingly, there are
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low price PM guarantee guarantee
guarantee guarantee (median) (range)
Department store 8 5 4 5.0 .001￿25
Electronics 14 7 5 5.0 0￿10
Oﬃce supplies 9 5 3 2.0 1-5
Sporting goods 6 4 4 5.0 1-10
Cameras 9 1 1 7.5 7.5
Total 46 22 17 5.0 0￿25
Table 2: Summary of data
no published data on this question. Accordingly, we surveyed 46 prominent retail-
ers in the U.S. and Canada, from ￿ve categories: department stores (e.g., Sears,
Bloomingdales), electronics stores (e.g., Radio Shack, Audio Accessories), camera
stores (e.g., Central Camera, B&H Photo/Video), sporting goods (e.g., Oshman￿s,
Academy Sports), and oﬃce supply stores (e.g., Oﬃce Max, Goeller￿s Oﬃce and Art
Supplies).21 Each of these retailers was asked a series of questions about their price
matching policies: whether they oﬀered a low price guarantee, and if so, whether it
was a price-matching or a price-beating guarantee, percent of customers redeeming
a low price guarantee, and whether the redemption rate reported was based on a
s t u d yb yt h e￿rm or a ￿best guess.￿ In addition, we have information on whether
the retailer is a ￿chain store￿ (one outlet of a multi-outlet retailer) or not.22 Not
all retailers with a low price guarantee reported a redemption rate￿four of the 22
retailers oﬀering a low price guarantee refused to divulge their redemption rate￿and
￿fteen of the eighteen retailers who did report, acknowledged that the redemption
rate was a "best guess" rather than based on an internal company study. Table 1
summarizes the data.
21This was not a random sample of retailers. Our aim, however, is to show that examples of price
matching that can be plausibly explained only by the signalling motivation are found in actual retail
markets.
22In general, we spoke with people in middle or senior management: the most common rank of
person surveyed, among the chain stores, was vice-president, and among the non-chain stores, store
manager.
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Table 3: Reported Frequency of Redemption of Guarantee
The average reported redemption rate across the 18 retailers who oﬀered a low
price guarantee is 5.8% and 12 of the 18 reported redemption rates of 5% or less.
Critically, among the four retailers whose reported redemption rates were based on
internal studies rather than managers￿ perceptions, the redemption rates were .001%,
1%, 2% and 10%. The 3 cases of redemption rates of 10%, and 1 case with 25%,
are perhaps consistent with the price discrimination story (assuming, of course, that
the reporting is accurate). But the majority of the cases are not. At a minimum,
it seems highly unlikely that these retailers are using their low price guarantees to
price discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers if only 5 percent or
less of consumers are redeeming. Certainly, in 3 of the 4 most reliably reported
data points, the price discrimination theory is not plausible. On the basis of this
empirical implication alone, we are left with the price signalling theory and the cartel
facilitation theory to explain the majority of cases in our data set.
Universality of price-matching within a market
The cartel theory, as it has been developed in the literature, predicts that all ￿rms in
the market oﬀer price matching. In the absence of some asymmetries in the incentives
for ￿rms to cheat on a cartel price, there is no reason for the device to be adopted by
only some ￿rms within a given (product and geographic) market. An extension to the
theory would allow a high-cost ￿rm to oﬀer a price-matching guarantee in order to
deter a lower-cost ￿rm from cheating: lower-cost ￿rms generally have more incentive
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that only the lower-cost ￿rms adopt price-matching. The price-discrimination theory
is also inconsistent with all ￿rms adopting price-matching, since a ￿rm can use price-
matching as a price discrimination device only if some other ￿rm charges a lower price
in equilibrium. This theory predicts, as well, that the higher-cost ￿rm would have a
greater incentive to oﬀer a price-matching guarantee since higher-cost ￿rms would like
to charge higher prices than lower-cost ￿rms. In sum, the adoption of price-matching
by all ￿rms in a market is consistent only with the cartel theory, and to the extent
not all ￿rms do so, the signalling theory predicts that only the lower-cost ￿rms would
oﬀer them, whereas the other theories predict the opposite.
Our data clearly show that not all retailers in a given market oﬀer price-matching
guarantees. For instance: among electronics retailers, Best Buy oﬀers a price-matching
guarantee, but Radio Shack does not; among department stores, Dillards oﬀers a
price-matching guarantee, but Bloomingdale￿s does not; among oﬃce supply stores,
Staples oﬀers a price-matching guarantee, but Berger Brothers Oﬃce Supply (in
Wilmington, Delaware) does not; among sporting goods retailers, Oshman￿s oﬀers
a price-matching guarantee, but Academy Sports does not; among camera stores, all
except one retailer (Merkle Camera in Toronto) does not oﬀer a price-matching or a
price-beating guarantee.
Who invokes price-matching?
What distinguishes the retailers who oﬀer a low price guarantee from those who do
not? We would like to have direct measures of costs, or indices of prices for similar
products across the sample of stores. Instead, we suggest that the status of a store
as a chain store outlet is negatively correlated with price. In Table 2 we show a
cross-tabulation of the retailer￿s low price guarantee policy and whether or not it is
a chain store. Clearly, whether the retailer is a chain store or not matters (Pearson￿s
χ2(1) = 19.01,p<. 001). Since chain-store retailers are likely to have lower costs
than non-chain-store retailers, this supports the signalling theory, but not the cartel
or price discrimination theories.
Moreover, the evidence examined on the rate of redemption of price-matching
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Low price guarantee 21 1
No guarantee 8 16
Table 4: Cross-tabulation of low price guarantee provision and whether or not the
retailer is a chain-storer
guarantees shows that in a substantial number of cases the rate is very small, sug-
gesting that in these cases the price-matching ￿rms are at or near the low-price point
of the market.23
Impact of price-matching on prices of price-matching ￿rms
If one is examining prices in a given product market across a variety of geographic
markets or areas, or comparing prices in a given region before and after price-matching
is adopted, then the prediction of the cartel theory is that price-matching causes
the prices of the price-matching ￿rms to increase. After all, the purpose of the
instrument is to protect cartel pricing in this theory. Under the price discrimination
theory, the list prices of a ￿rm will also rise with the adoption of price-matching as the
￿rm avails itself of the opportunity to charge higher prices to consumers with more
inelastic demands. (The average transactions price, net of price-matching refunds,
may rise or fall.) In the signalling theory, where the purpose of price-matching is to
23Edlin (1997) oﬀers an argument as to why the price-matching ￿rms might not be the highest
priced in the market:
"Another reason that price will vary among sellers and that only some sellers should be expected
to adopt price matching is that sellers often have diﬀerent costs. When costs diﬀer, the monopoly
price for a low-cost seller will be lower than for a high-cost one. The low-cost seller will have no
reason to raise its price above its own monopoly price, but the high cost seller will typically charge
a higher price. If a seller has costs so high that it is unpro￿table to sell at the price of low-cost
￿rms, it will abandon its matching policy and specialize in selling to uninformed buyers. . .Thus, in
practice, we should not necessarily expect every ￿rm to post the same price, nor every ￿rm to oﬀer a
matching policy." (footnote deleted). However. in Edlin￿s model, the only basis for price-matching
is price discrimination, under which theory the lowest ￿rms in the market have no incentive for
invoking the practice.
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the practice is, ironically, to increase prices (Proposition 6). The direction of price
change by price-matching ￿rms oﬀers no test for distinguishing among the theories
(although it does oﬀer a test of the theories collectively). The magnitude of the
price increase, however, may oﬀer a distinguishing test. However, we are not aware
of any study that performs such a test. Hess and Gerstner￿s (1991) observation of
a 1.6% increase in supermarket prices in the Raleigh, North Carolina market from
￿before￿ to ￿after￿ is based on market data￿average prices across price-matching
and non-price-matching stores.24 Since the supermarkets in question had over 92%
of the relevant market, and the products in question were generally leading-market-
share brands in staple categories (ketchup, mayonnaise, milk, etc), this seems too low
to represent a plausible move from competitive to cartel pricing. Anecdotally, they
provide some evidence against the price discrimination theory in their study. One
of the supermarkets oﬀering a price-matching guarantee has a policy of lowering its
shelf-price when a customer reports a lower price at a competitor.
Impact of price-matching on prices of non-price-matching ￿rms
The signalling theory predicts that in a market where a single ￿rm adopts price-
matching, the impact is to lower the prices of other ￿rms (Proposition 6). On the
other hand, in the cartel theory (if plausibly extended to a model with asymmetries in
incentives to invoke price-matching), the very purpose of the instrument is to provide
rivals with the incentive to set or maintain high prices. The price discrimination
theory would also predict an increase in non-price-matching rivals￿ prices via strategic
complementarity since we have argued earlier that price-matching ￿rms under this
theory will increase their prices. Hess and Gerstner￿s (1991) study ￿nds a 2.7%
24 Strictly speaking, what they observe is a 1.6% increase in the ratio of ￿included market prices￿
to ￿excluded market prices.￿ Here, ￿included￿ (￿excluded￿) refers to a basket of goods covered (not
covered) by the price-matching guarantee. Given that the ￿included￿ and ￿excluded￿ products were
diﬀerent￿for example, perishable store brands ￿gured prominently in the latter basket, but not in
the former￿there is a possibility that diﬀerent cost and demand dynamics applied to the numerator
and denominator of the ratio. Furthermore, the ￿before￿-￿after￿ comparison in the study is not a
pure comparison: one of the supermarkets had a price-matching policy in force even in the "before"
period.
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of price-matching by a store, but this ￿nding is subject to several caveats as discussed
above.
Pro￿tability in a market with many ￿rms
Notwithstanding the theory that price-matching facilitates cartel pricing, cartels are
realistic only for markets with speci￿c structural features: small number of ￿rms, some
barriers to entry, relatively stable costs, transparent prices. The price discrimination
theory does not require a small number of ￿rms (Edlin 1997). The signalling theory
is developed in this paper in a model with only two ￿rms, but this is not necessary
for the theory. The explanation could plausibly be extended to the case of a large
number of ￿rms in a market as long as there is price dispersion, arising from variation
in costs or variation in consumer search costs or in tastes with respect to the trade-oﬀ
between lower prices and higher quality or service. Firms at the lower end of the
price distribution could oﬀer price-matching as a signal of low prices.
Impact of price-matching on consumer search
In the price discrimination theory, the discovery by a consumer that a store has a price-
matching policy is evidence to the consumer that other stores are charging even lower
prices. This evidence should, if anything, encourage the consumer to search further.
In the cartel theory, a consumer might search further in response to the discovery of a
price-matching policy if the consumer believed that the practice was being invoked by
a￿ p o c k e t ￿o fc o l l u d i n g￿rms selling close substitutes within a broader, diﬀerentiated
product market; or a consumer, having read the literature, might infer that all ￿rms
are cartelized, so further search would be futile. The impact on consumer search
is ambiguous. In the signalling model, a price-matching announcement would tell
the consumer that the ￿rm was relatively low-priced and that further search was
unlikely to be optimal. Srivastava and Lurie (2001) ￿nd experimental evidence that
consumers are less likely to search after encountering a ￿rm with a price-matching
policy. They expose consumers to several simulated shopping environments in a
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and the non-price-matching stores. They ￿nd that subjects are more likely to stop
searching, by as much as 25 percent, after they have been to a price-matching store
than after they have been to a non-price-matching store.25
4C o n c l u s i o n
Our results show that the addition of an arbitrarily small percentage of imperfectly
informed consumers can strengthen the traditional argument that price-matching can
facilitate cartel pricing.26 When product diﬀerentiation is recognized, this arbitrarily
small transaction cost changes price-matching from a strategy that carries the threat
(for the ￿rms) of increasing competition to a strategy that ensures cartel pricing as
a dominant strategy equilibrium.
But the model yields another explanation for price-matching: that the announce-
ment communicates a ￿rm￿s position as the lowest-priced in the market. The signal
has value because price-matching policies are clear, easily understood messages that
a r em u c he a s i e rt or e m e m b e rt h a na￿rm￿s complete list of prices. The signal has
credibility because heterogeneity across ￿rms means heterogeneity in optimal prices,
and because price-matching entails delegation. A high-priced ￿rm that mimiced the
price-matching announcement of a low-priced ￿rm would be delegating its pricing,
for informed consumers, to a rival whose optimal price is diﬀerent than its own.
The credibility of the signal to uninformed consumers is ensured by the behavior of
25In addition to the data described here, anecdotal evidence of the use of price-matching by stores
that are well-known to be among the lowest-priced in the market (and perhaps of low service as
well) has been suggested to us. These examples include cases of ￿rms with small market shares,
but generally these are the exceptions (implication 8 of Table 1). As observed in Table 4, the stores
oﬀering price-matching policies tend to be the larger ones. For instance, price-matching policies are
widely observed among "big box" retailers like Best Buy and Circuit City￿￿rms that provide a
minimal level of service and low prices, and enjoy substantial economies of scale.
26The discontinuity is reminiscent of the Diamond Paradox that an arbitrarily small degree of
(universal) search costs can leave the monopoly price as the only possible outcome of a market with
frictions (Diamond 1971).
33
35 Moorthy and Winter: Price-Matching Guarantees
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012informed consumers.
A rich set of implications distinguishes the cartel theory, a price discrimination
theory (which is also a theory of price-matching as anticompetitive in that it implies
that the strategy allows the containment of competition-enhancing search external-
ities), and the price matching-as-information theory. Price matching is far too
common, and retail market structures far too competitive, to be explained by the
cartel theory. In a substantial number of cases from a sample of prominent retailers
the discrimination theory can be rejected. In particular, the rate of redemption of
price-matching guarantees is of the order of 5%. Also, the empirical literature sug-
gests that consumers view price-matching stores as more competitive than non-price-
matching stores. Price matching in our model accords with the business person￿s
view of price-matching as a way to compete.
We have assumed in this paper that the only variation among ￿rms that could be
re￿ected in price diﬀerences is cost variation. In reality, in many retail markets, ￿rms
have access to very similar technologies, but end up choosing technologies of diﬀerent
costs. For example, ￿rms may choose to adopt a low-cost distribution strategy to sell
products at the low-price, low-quality, low-service end of the market in order to attract
customers with such preferences (e.g., Wal-Mart) or choose a high-cost distribution
strategy to sell products at the high-price, high-quality, high-service end of the market
(e.g., Bloomingdales). Many models with consumer heterogeneity predict vertical
diﬀerentiation even where ￿rms face identical technological choice sets. We believe
that the theory of price-matching policies as signals of low prices could be extended
to such models.
In our model price-matching by conveying information about prices allows a more
eﬃcient allocation of consumers to ￿rms. The low-cost ￿rm achieves a higher market
share under price-matching. In a model extended to vertical diﬀerentiation, price-
matching would also allow a more eﬃcient match of consumers to ￿rms based on
quaility preferences. But another extension of the model yields an important qual-
i￿cation to eﬃciency claims. Suppose that consumers decide endogenously whether
to become informed about prices (and be ￿active shoppers￿) or to shop on the basis
of inferences drawn from stores￿ price-matching policies (thus remaining ￿inference
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no consumers will want to become active shoppers. But the presence of some active
shoppers is necessary for information conveyance by price-matching ￿ and inference
shopping ￿ to be possible in equilibrium. This paradox can be resolved in a ￿noisy
rational expectations￿ framework, in which the price-matching policy conveys some
but not all information about prices.27 The resolution, however, reveals a quali￿ca-
tion to the eﬃciency of price-matching in directing consumers towards low-cost ￿rms:
price matching encourages many consumers to become inference shoppers rather than
active shoppers. Since only active shopping or search disciplines prices in a market,
a potential eﬀect of price matching in this extended model is a reduction in the
competitive discipline that search imposes on prices.
27 One can assume, for example, that price-matching is decided after the realization of ￿long-
term￿ costs, but a short-term cost shock (such as the amount of excess inventory) is realized after
the price-match decision but before prices are set.
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